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ABSTRACT 
This paper analyzes an interaction between a carbon-tax collecting and investing coalition of rich countries, ab-
staining rich countries and poor countries. The non-coalition countries may suffer from loss of reputation and 
guilt and may overstate the emission-moderating effect of the carbon tax. As long as these three types of coun-
tries react to their counterparts’ emissions, taxing carbon-dioxide emissions unilaterally does not necessarily re-
duce the global emissions. Nor does it necessarily moderate the emissions of the coalition. 
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1. Introduction 
The atmosphere is an indivisible open-access natural 
resource. In the absence of property rights, formation of 
markets for the externalities created by emissions of 
greenhouse gasses is impossible (cf. Coase [1]). Hence, 
there is a need for international cooperation. But can a 
grand coalition of nations for reducing emissions be real-
ised? The international meetings held on this issue sug-
gest that the answer is negative. Internal issues and free- 
riding of sovereign countries provide explanations to the 
empty core of the cooperative game of international 
emission reduction. Moreover, the absence of a mecha-
nism for enforcing sufficiently strong penalties on sover-
eign countries (large ones, in particular) abstaining from 
the grand coalition, or the inexistence of an environmen-
tally oriented dictating country, implies that any strong 
epsilon-core is empty (cf. Shapley and Shubik [2]). 
The policy measures for controlling greenhouse-gas 
emissions and their external effects are classified in the 
environmental economic literature as quantity-based in-
struments and price-based instruments. Theoretical com-
parisons of these instruments have followed Weitzman’s 
[3] generic analysis of stock-based externalities, which 
linked their relative efficiency to the relative slopes of 
the marginal benefits and costs of control. In the context 
of greenhouse gasses and climate change, Pizer [4], Hoel 
and Karp [5], Newell and Pizer [6], and Fischer and 
Newell [7] have provided arguments in favour of price- 
based instruments. 
Proponents of emission tax expect the tax to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions by increasing efficiency in 
fossil-fuel consumption and encouraging and financing 
the development and adoption of cleaner sources of en-
ergies and technologies. While the responsibility for, and 
consequences of, greenhouse gas emissions are shared by 
all countries, only a few are willing to tax emissions. In 
the absence of international agreement on operative 
scheme, carbon tax has been unilaterally implemented in 
Scandinavian and West European countries, Canada, 
New Zealand and Australia.  
This paper argues that the reactions of the unwilling 
countries to the expected emissions of the willing coun-
tries are crucial for assessing the effectiveness of the said 
price-based policy instrument. The analysis leading to 
this conclusion is based on an environmentally favoura-
ble polar framework. Hence, ineffectiveness of a price- 
based policy instrument in that framework implies inef-
fectiveness in a less favourable framework. The consi-
dered favourable framework allows a carbon-tax charg-
ing coalition of environmentally and reputation concerned 
rich countries to exist. The coalition taxes members’ 
emissions and generates a positive common-pool exter-
nality for members by concertedly investing the carbon- 
tax revenues in improving fossil-fuel consumption’s effi-
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ciency and developing and adopting low-emission 
energy sources and technologies. The abstaining, less 
environmentally and reputation concerned, rich countries 
incur international reputation and political loss for per 
capita emissions beyond the coalition’s level. Poor coun-
tries do not incur such loss due to their low per capita 
emissions and consumption. The positive common-pool 
externality and the international reputation and political 
loss strengthen the inclination of the environmentally and 
reputation more concerned rich countries to stay in the 
coalition.  
The computation of the equilibrium carbon-dioxide 
emissions also takes into account another environmen-
tally favourable aspect: a possible guilt effect on the ab-
staining countries’ level of concern for the environment. 
However, the computation takes into account that some 
of the expectations of the three types of countries about 
each other’s emissions can be understated due to a possi-
ble excessive impression created by the coalition’s envi-
ronmental initiatives.  
The computed equilibrium reveals that as long as the 
three types of countries react to their counterparts’ emis-
sions, taxing carbon-dioxide emissions and investing the 
tax revenues in development and adoption of cleaner 
energy sources and technologies do not necessarily re-
duce global emissions, nor do they moderate the coali-
tion’s emissions. This conclusion also holds under accu-
rate expectations and absence of guilt in the abstaining 
countries. The analysis of the equilibrium identifies the 
conditions under which the unilateral implementation of 
the carbon-tax by the coalition decreases the coalition’s 
emissions and global emissions. 
The scepticism implied by the analysis about the ef-
fectiveness of one-sidedly implemented carbon tax in a 
sub group of willing rich countries should not be inter-
preted as supporting a wait-and-see strategy. The risk of 
global warming and, consequently, climate change is real. 
Global warming is mainly a reflection of a chronic and 
intensifying imbalance in the atmospheric carbon-dioxide 
cycle. Contrasted with deep historical measurements ob-
tained from Antarctic ice-cores, the Keeling Curve re-
veals unprecedented levels and rates of accumulation of 
carbon-dioxide in the atmosphere during the last five 
decades. This trend is expected to be supported by con-
tinued population growth, industrialization of developing 
countries and deforestation of tropical lands. Since the 
atmosphere is indivisible and climate change is a global 
stock-based externality, international cooperation and 
planning is desirable. The implied scepticism about the 
effectiveness of one-sidedly implemented carbon tax in a 
sub group of willing rich countries emphasizes the need 
for global cooperation. 
The analytical part of the paper is structured as follows. 
Section 2 classifies the stakeholders as members of a 
coalition of carbon-tax paying rich countries, or abstain-
ing rich countries, or abstaining poor countries, and de-
scribes their utilities. Section 3 derives the reaction of 
each stakeholder to the counterparts’ emissions. Section 
4 computes the stakeholders’ equilibrium per capita 
emissions. The computation of the equilibrium emission 
levels takes into account the possibility that the abstain-
ing countries suffer from guilt and/or overstate the emis-
sion-moderating effect of the carbon tax on the coalition 
countries’ emissions. With the computed equilibrium in 
mind, Section 5 derives propositions that reflect scepti-
cism about the effectiveness of one-sidedly implemented 
carbon tax by a group of willing rich countries. 
2. Stakeholders and Their Utilities 
Suppose that the world has rN  rich countries divided 
into two distinct groups by their degree of concern about 
the state of the world’s environment. Those with the 
higher degree of concern (denoted by subscript rc), rcN  
in number, form a carbon-tax collecting and investing 
coalition. The other r rcN N−  rich countries with the 
lower degree of concern (denoted by subscript ra), abstain. 
For tractability, the population of each of the coalition 
countries is rcP  and the population of each of the ab-
staining rich countries is raP . The poor countries (denoted 
by subscript p) are pN  in number. For simplicity, they 
have the same size of population, pP , and the same de-
gree of concern about the state of the world’s environment. 
The three types of countries produce the same com-
posite good, but with different technologies and levels of 
carbon-dioxide emissions per unit. With pq  indicating 
the emissions released by the production process of the 
representative resident of the poor countries and 0α >  
the ratio of his output to emissions, the per capita output 
and also (with income-tax revenues being redistributed) 
disposable income in the poor countries is: 
d
p py qα= .                (1) 
Before the formation of the carbon-tax collecting and 
investing coalition, all the rN  rich countries have 
shared a technology that was more fuel-efficient, hence 
cleaner (per given output), than that of the poor countries. 
This technology prevails in the abstaining rich countries. 
With raq  indicating the emissions released by the pro-
duction process of the representative resident of the ab-
staining rich countries and 0η >  the difference in the 
output-emission ratio between the abstaining rich coun-
tries and the poor countries, the per capita output and 
also disposable income in the abstaining rich countries is: 
( )dra ray qα η= + .              (2) 
With rcq  indicating the emissions released by the 
production process of the representative resident of the 
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coalition’s rich countries, 0τ >  the carbon-tax rate on 
domestic emissions set by the coalition, and 0β >  the 
marginal return on the aggregate carbon-tax revenues
( )rc rc rcq N Pτ  invested concertedly by the coalition in 
development and adoption of cleaner energy sources and 
technologies, the per capita disposable income in the 
coalition countries is: 
( ) ( )drc rc rc rc rcy N P q qα η β τ τ = + + −  .    (3) 
The term ( )rc rc rcN P qβ τ  displays a positive com-
mon-pool externality. In addition to a greater concern 
about the environment and a potential international repu-
tation and political loss, access to the cleaner energy 
sources and technologies developed by the concerted 
investment of the aggregate emission-tax revenues pro-
vides an incentive for each of the rcN  coalition coun-
tries to cooperate. 
Each type of country, , ,i p ra rc= , gains utility from 
its per capita disposable income, diy , at a rate 0iγ > , 
which represents a constant, for tractability, marginal 
utility from disposable income. Each type of country also 
gains utility from environmental improvement ( 0E∆ > ) 
and loses utility from environmental deterioration 
( )0E∆ <  at a rate 0iφ >  that reflects its degree of 
concern about changes in the environment. Recalling the 
aforementioned concern-differential between the two 
types of rich countries, rc raφ φ>
1. 
The per capita utility in an abstaining rich country is 
further diminished by international reputation and politi-
cal loss from exceeding the coalition’s per capita emis-  
sion. This loss is intensified by the exceptionality of the 
rich country’s abstinence and by the power of the coali-
tion. 
With the scalar ψ  (positive when 0ra rcq q− >  and 
zero otherwise) denoting the international reputation and 
political loss coefficient2: 
( )2
for ,
for
d
i i i
i d
i i i ra rc
y E i p rc
u
y E q q i ra
γ φ
γ φ ψ
 + ∆ == 
+ ∆ − − =
.   (4) 
With 0E  denoting the initial state of the global envi-
ronment, 0eg >  the global environment’s natural re-
generation rate, and 0δ >  the coefficient of a convex 
form (quadratic, for simplicity) representing the damage 
inflicted by deviations from zero emissions (via global 
warming and climate change) on the global environment, 
the change in the global environment is assumed to be 
given by: 
( ) 20e p p p rc rc rc ra r rc raE g E q N P q N P q N N Pδ  ∆ = − + + −  . 
(5) 
For tractability, the decay of the initial atmospheric car-
bon-dioxide stock is ignored. While complicating the 
construction of a convex damage function that receives a 
negative value when the net change in the atmospheric 
stock is negative, the inclusion of decay does not change 
the nature of the conclusions. In addition, the life expec-
tancy of carbon-dioxide molecules in the atmosphere is 
very long (up to several hundreds of years); namely, the 
rate of decay of the stock is very low. 
 
In view of (1)-(5), the utilities of the representative agents of the three types of countries are: 
( ){ }20p p p p e p p p rc rc rc ra r rc rau q g E q N P q N P q N N Pγ α φ δ  = + − + + −                      (6) 
( ) ( ) ( ){ }20rc rc rc rc rc rc rc e p p p rc rc rc ra r rc rau N P q q g E q N P q N P q N N Pγ α η β τ τ φ δ   = + + − + − + + −               (7) 
( ) ( ){ } ( )2 20ra ra ra ra e p p p rc rc rc ra r rc ra ra rcu q g E q N P q N P q N N P q qγ α η φ δ ψ = + + − + + − − −  .           (8) 
3. Reactions to Counterparts’ Emissions 
In each of the three types of countries, per capita carbon-dioxide emission is set at a level that maximizes the represen-
tative agent’s utility, given the expectations about the foreign counterparts’ emissions. From the necessary condition, 
the reaction function of the utility-maximizing representative agent living in a poor country to the expected emissions 
(denoted by the superscript e/p) of the agents living in the coalition’s rich countries and the abstaining rich countries is: 
( )
( )/ /
2
2
p r rc rae p e prc rc
p rc ra
p p p pp p p
N N PN P
q q q
N P N PN P
γ α
φ δ
     − = − −            
.                      (9) 
 
 
1The “environmental Kuznets curve hypothesis” (Selden and Song [8]; Grossman and Krueger [9]) and the “affluence hypothesis” (Diekmann and 
Franzen [10]; Franzen [11]) suggest that ra pφ φ> . 
2When 0ra rcq q− > , ψ  can be taken to be proportional to ( )rc rc r rc raN P N N P−    if this ratio represents the exceptionality of abstinence and the 
power of the coalition. 
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The first term on the right-hand side indicates the poor countries’ optimal per capita emission in the absence of emis-
sions from other sources. The representative agent of a poor country reduces (increases) his emissions when a rise (de-
cline) in his richer counterparts’ emissions is expected, proportionally to their relative population size. 
The reaction function of the utility-maximizing representative agent living in a coalition country to the expected 
emissions (denoted by the superscript e/rc) of the agents living in the non-coalition rich countries and the poor countries is: 
( )
[ ]
( )e/ /
2
rc p p rc r rc rarc rc e rc
rc p ra
rc rc rc rc rc rc rc rc rc rc rc
N P N N P
q q q
N P N P N P N P
φ δ φ δγ α η τ
φ δ βτ φ δ βτ φ δ βτ
   −+ −  
= − −       − − −    
.      (10) 
The first term on the right-hand side indicates the coalition’s optimal per capita emission in the absence of emissions 
from the abstaining countries. Noting that the second-order condition for maximum requires 0rc rc rcN Pφ δ βτ− > , the 
representative agent of a coalition country reduces (increases) his emissions when a rise (decline) in his poor and ab-
staining-rich counterparts’ emissions is expected. His reaction is intensified by his counterparts’ relative population size 
and by the return on the investment of the emission-tax in developing and adopting cleaner energy sources and technologies.  
The reaction function of an agent living in an abstaining rich country to the expected emissions (denoted by the su-
perscript e/ra) of the agents living in the coalition’s rich countries and poor countries is: 
( )
( )
( )
( )
( )
( )
/ /
2 2 22 2 2
0.5 ra rc rc r rc rara p p r rc rra e ra e ra
ra p rc
ra r rc ra ra r rc ra ra r rc ra
N P N N PN P N N P
q q q
N N P N N P N N P
φ δ ψφ δγ α η
φ δ ψ φ δ ψ φ δ ψ
 − −−+  = − −
     − + − + − +     
.     (11) 
The first term on the right-hand side indicates the abstaining rich countries’ optimal per capita emission in the absence 
of emissions from other sources. The representative agent of an abstaining rich country reduces (increases) his emis-
sions when a rise (decline) in his poorer counterparts’ emissions is expected. His reaction is intensified by the poorer 
population’s relative size. If ( )ra rc rc r rc raN P N N Pφ δ ψ− > , he also reduces (increases) his emissions when a rise (de-
cline) in the coalition’s per capita emissions is expected. His reactions are moderated by his marginal international 
reputation and political loss, ψ , engendered by a deviation from the coalition’s per capita emission.  
4. Inaccurate Expectations, Guilt and Equilibrium Emissions 
In computing the equilibrium emissions (denoted by asterisks), let us allow some of the expectations of the three types 
of countries about each-other’s emissions to be inaccurate. It is possible that, being impressed by the coalition’s envi-
ronmental initiatives, the abstaining countries overstate the emission-moderating effect of the emission tax and hence 
understate the per capita emissions of the coalition. By the same rationale it is further possible that the higher the tax 
rate, the stronger the abstaining countries’ impression and, consequently, understatement of the coalition’s actual emis-
sion. We let ( )raε τ  and ( )pε τ  indicate the expectation errors of the abstaining rich countries and the poor countries, 
respectively, with ( )0 0raε =  and ( )0 0pε =  and ( ) 0raε τ′ ≥  and ( ) 0pε τ′ ≥ , and consider the case where only the 
expectations about the rich coalition countries’ emissions can be inaccurate: / *e rcra raq q= , 
/ *e rc
p pq q= , 
/ *e ra
p pq q=  and 
/ *e p
ra raq q= , ( )/ *e rarc rc raq q ε τ= −  and ( )/ *e prc rc pq q ε τ= − . 
While it can be expected that the abstaining countries’ understatement of the coalition’s emissions contributes to 
global emissions, it is possible that the coalition’s environmental initiatives intensify the abstaining countries’ sense of 
guilt and moderate their free-riding. It is further possible that the higher the coalition’s emission tax, the stronger the 
guilt sensed by the abstaining countries. Their intensified sense of guilt can be manifested in increased concerns about 
the environment: ( ) 0raφ τ′ ≥  and ( ) 0pφ τ′ ≥ , where a zero-gradient indicates a guilt-free disposition.  
The incorporation of the said expectations and a possible concern-intensifying guilt into the reaction Equations 
(9)-(11) leads to: 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )* * *2
2
p r rc rarc rc
p rc p ra
p p p pp p p
N N PN P
q q q
N P N PN P
γ α
ε τ
φ τ δ
     −   = − − −             
                 (12) 
[ ]
( )* * *( )
2
rc p p rc r rc rarc
rc p ra
rc rc rc rc rc rc rc rc rc rc rc
N P N N P
q q q
N P N P N P N P
φ δ φ δγ α η τ
φ δ βτ φ δ βτ φ δ βτ
   − + −
= − −       − − −    
           (13) 
( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( )* * *2 2 22 2 2
0.5 ra rc rc r rc rara p p r rc rra
ra p rc ra
ra r rc ra ra r rc ra ra r rc ra
N P N N PN P N N P
q q q
N N P N N P N N P
φ τ δ ψφ τ δγ α η
ε τ
φ τ δ ψ φ τ δ ψ φ τ δ ψ
 − −−+    = − − −      − + − + − +     
.  
(14) 
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In turn, the equilibrium per capita emissions are3: 
( ) ( ) ( )* 1 2
2
rc p p rc
rc rc p p p
p p rc rc
q N P
N P N P
φ φ τ γ α γ α η τ
φ δ ε τ
βτ
   + −    = − + 
    
                (15) 
( ) ( ) ( )( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
* * 1 2
2
ra r rc ra p
ra rc ra ra ra rc rc r rc ra ra p
p p p
N N P
q q N P N N P
N P
φ τ γ α
ε τ γ α η φ τ δ ε τ ε τ
ψ φ τ
 −
 = − + + − + − −  
  
 (16) 
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
* *
2
2
1 2
2
p r rc ra rc rc r rc rarc rc
p p ra rc
p p p p p pp p p
ra r rc ra pr rc ra
ra ra rc rc r rc ra ra p
p p p p p
N N P N P N N PN P
q q
N P N P N PN P
N N PN N P
N P N N P
N P N P
γ α
ε τ ε τ
φ τ δ
φ τ γ α
γ α η φ τ δ ε τ ε τ
ψ φ τ
       − + − = + + −                  
   −−  − + − + − −        


 (17) 
and the equilibrium global emissions are: 
( ) ( ) ( )
* * * *
2
p
rc rc rc r rc ra ra p p p rc rc p
p p p
Q N P q N N P q N P q N P
N P
γ α
ε τ
φ τ δ
≡ + − + = + .              (18) 
5. Propositions and Concluding Remarks 
The equilibrium indicated in equations (15)-(18) leads to the following propositions and concluding remarks. 
Proposition 1: If  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ){ }1 2rc p p p p p p rc p p pN P N Pφ φ τ γ α τφ τ φ τ φ δ ε τ′   + +     
is larger than 
( ) ( ) ( )2rc rc rc rc p p pN P N Pγ α η φ δ ε τ τ′ + +  , 
then a unilateral implementation of carbon tax and a concerted green investment of the tax revenues by a coalition of 
rich countries reduce the coalition’s per capita emissions. However, if 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ){ }1 2rc p p p p p p rc p p pN P N Pφ φ τ γ α τφ τ φ τ φ δ ε τ′   + +     
is smaller than  
( ) ( ) ( )2rc rc rc rc p p pN P N Pγ α η φ δ ε τ τ′ + +  , 
then a unilateral implementation of carbon tax and a concerted green investment of the tax revenues by a coalition of 
rich countries increase the coalition’s per capita emissions. (See Appendix for proof.) 
The effectiveness of the tax in reducing the coalition’s emissions increases with the poor countries’ sense of guilt, but 
diminishes with the poor countries’ inclination to overstate the moderating effect of the tax on the coalition’s emissions.  
Proposition 2: If  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )2ra ra rc rc r rc ra ra pN P N N Pγ α η φ τ δ ε τ ε τ + + − −   
is greater than 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )2r rc ra p p ra p p raN N P N P φ τ φ τ γ α ψε τ   − +   , 
then the per capita emission of the abstaining rich countries is larger than the per capita emission in the carbon-tax 
collecting and investing coalition. However, if  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )2ra ra rc rc r rc ra ra pN P N N Pγ α η φ τ δ ε τ ε τ + + − −   
is smaller than 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )2r rc ra p p ra p p raN N P N P φ τ φ τ γ α ψε τ   − +   ,   
 
 
3Equations (15) and (16) are obtained by substituting the right-hand side of (12) into (13) and (14), respectively, and rearranging and collecting terms. 
Equation (17) is obtained by substituting the right-hand side of equation (16) into equation (12). If entree to, and exit from, the coalition are free and 
motivated by utility gains, the carbon-tax rate that ensures the stability of rcN  strong coalition is a τ̂  maintaining equality between the utility of 
the residents of the coalition and the utility of residents of the abstaining rich countries with equilibrium emissions. 
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then the per capita emission of the abstaining rich coun-
tries is smaller than the per capita emission in the car-
bon-tax collecting and investing coalition. (Straightfor-
ward from Equation (16)) 
The possibility of a negative per capita emission dif-
ferential between the abstaining rich countries and the 
coalition increases with the abstaining countries’ loss of 
international reputation stemming from understating the 
coalition’s per capita emission. It also increases with the 
poor-countries’ utility from the output facilitated by a 
unit of emission, weighted by the abstaining rich coun-
tries’ relative population and degree of concern about the 
environment. The said possibility is diminished by the 
abstaining rich countries’ utility from the output facili-
tated by a unit of emission. It is also diminished by the 
coalition-emission’s understatement differential between 
the abstaining rich countries and the poor countries, am-
plified by the damage coefficient, by the abstaining rich 
countries’ population and degree of concern for the en-
vironment and by the coalition’s population.  
Proposition 3: If  
( )
( )
( )22p p p p rc rc
p p
N P N Pφ τ φ τ δ
ε τ γ α
>
<
 ′ 
 = ′      
, 
then the global emissions are reduced, not affected, or 
increased by the carbon-tax set by the coalition, respec-
tively. (See Appendix for proof.) 
This proposition indicates the critical ratio of the poor- 
countries’ guilt-sensitivity to their inclination to overstate 
the effect of carbon-tax above which the implementation 
of carbon-tax by the coalition leads to reduced global 
emissions. 
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Appendix 
Proof of Proposition 1: From (12), 
( )
( )
( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( )
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2 22
1 2
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2 2
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+
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.
 
Proof of Proposition 3: The equilibrium global emissions are: 
( )* * * *rc rc rc r rc ra ra p p pQ N P q N N P q N P q≡ + − + . 
Recalling (15), (16) and (17), 
( ) ( )
*
2
p
rc rc p
p p p
Q N P
N P
γ α
ε τ
φ τ δ
= +  
Hence, 
( )
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( )2* 2
0 as p p p p rc rc
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N P N PQ φ τ φ τ δ
τ ε τ γ α
< >
> <
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